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 Dynamic Correlations across REIT Sub-Sectors 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The issue of whether Real Estate Investment Trusts should pursue a focused or diversified 
investment strategy remains an ongoing debate within both the academic and industry 
communities. This paper considers the relationship between REITs focused on different property 
sectors in a GARCH-DCC framework. The daily conditional correlations reveal that since 1990 
there has been a marked upward trend in the coefficients between US REIT sub-sectors. The 
findings imply that REITs are behaving in a far more homogeneous manner than in the past. 
Furthermore, the argument that REITs should be focused in order that investors can make the 
diversification decision is reduced. 
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1. Introduction 
The last two decades has seen a remarkable growth in the Real Estate Investment Trust market in 
the United States. In 1990 there were 58 listed Equity REITs with a combined market 
capitalization of just over $5.5bn. The early nineties saw developments such as the passing of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act and the introduction of the UPREIT structure and heralded 
the introduction of what is often referred to as the modern REIT era1. Subsequent years saw an 
increase in the size of the sector, both in terms of market capitalization and the number of firms, 
with a large number of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in the early to mid-nineties. Indeed, the 
growth in the sector can be illustrated that at the end of 2010, despite the challenges of recent 
years, the market capitalization of the listed Equity sector in the US was US$315bn. This growth 
has established REITs as the primary listed vehicle for investment in the property sector2.The 
primary headline advantage to obtaining REIT status is that the firm is tax transparent in that 
dividends are tax exempt. In order to qualify for this tax status US REITs must derive 75% of 
their income from real estate, have at least of 75% of their assets in real estate and are required to 
pay a minimum of 90% of their taxable income as dividends. Many empirical studies have shown 
that the characteristics of the sector changed quite substantially in during these years. A large 
proportion of this research has concentrated upon the nature of the relationship between REITs 
and the broader equity markets. For example, Glascock et al. (2000) illustrated that while REITs 
were segmented from the stock market prior to 1992 there was evidence of integration 
subsequently. Clayton and MacKinnon (2001) report that the correlation of REITs with respect to 
large and small cap stocks underwent a structural change in the 1990s. The authors argue that 
their findings can be attributed to the growing maturity of the REIT sector and the increase in 
institutional investment in the sector.  
 
The increase in institutional investment from the early to mid-nineties is quite marked. Chan et al. 
(2003) report that average institutional ownership was only 14% in 1992. The impact of the 
reforms of the early nineties can be seen very quickly, with the average institutional holding 
rising to 19% in 1993, a trend that continued throughout the nineties, with the figure reaching 
39% in 1999. For REITs listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) this figure was even 
higher at 45% and was in line with the average institutional ownership levels of non-REIT stocks 
listed on the NYSE. Lin et al. (2009) note that by 2005 this figure had exceeded 60%, with factors 
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such as the inclusion of REITs in the Standard & Poor‟s (S&P) indices in 2001 playing a role in 
the further increased investor acceptance of the sector. The increased level of institutional 
investor awareness also led to an increase in the number of analysts following the sector (Wang et 
al., 1995) and a reduction in the bid-ask spread of REIT shares (Below et al., 1996 and Bhasin et 
al., 1997). Not only has institutional investment increased generally, but the last two decades have 
seen a significant increase in the number of dedicated REIT mutual funds. Hartzell et al. (2010) 
note that the number of dedicated REIT mutual funds has increased from 16, prior to the 
structural changes in the market in the early eighties, to 235 in 2005, 132 of which are unique 
funds. Furthermore, Ling & Naranjo (2006) state that this led to an increase in the percentage of 
the sector‟s market capitalization held by REIT mutual funds rising from under 2% in 1992 to 
over 11% by 2003 and to over 14% by 2005 as noted by Hartzell et al. (2010).  
 
The impact of institutional investment can be observed in other forms as well. The modern REIT 
era has also been characterized by an increase in the level of trading in REIT shares. SNL 
Financial estimate that the cross-sector aggregate average daily volume in 1993 was 3 million 
shares. By 2006 this figure had increased to over 50 million shares. Furthermore, Cotter & 
Stevenson (2008) link the heightened volume with the increase in daily REIT volatility seen 
during the last decade. In their analysis of REIT volatility they find evidence of a significant 
positive relationship between volume and volatility. A number of studies have linked flows of 
funds from institutions to subsequent REIT returns. Wang et al. (1995), Chan et al. (1998) and 
Downs (1998) all find that a positive relationship exists between increased institutional 
investment and REIT performance. Ling & Naranjo (2003) also find evidence that equity flows in 
the post 1992 period do significantly affect REIT returns. However, it should be noted that the 
data used in the Ling & Naranjo (2003) study consisted of total capital flows and therefore was 
largely comprised of capital raised during IPOs and Secondary Equity Offerings (SEOs) and thus 
makes it hard to isolate the impacts originating from investor behavior3. Ling & Naranjo (2006) 
specifically consider flows from dedicated REIT mutual funds. They do find evidence of REIT 
performance significantly impacting upon future capital flows, a finding that would also be 
supportive of the momentum profits observed in REIT studies such as Chui et al. (2003) and 
Hung & Glascock (2008, 2010). However, Ling & Naranjo (2006) do not find evidence of REIT 
mutual fund flows significantly impacting subsequent returns, with the exception of an observed 
contemporaneous relationship between unexpected flows and returns.  
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However, while a growing literature has examined the impact of the growth in REITs with 
respect to the sector‟s relationship with the broader equity markets, little research has been 
undertaken that has examined the interaction between sub-sectors. The REIT sector in the US is 
characterized by the predominance of focused REITs. According to the National Association of 
Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) less than 10% of Equity REITs are classified as 
diversified, the majority being specialist in a single property type. As Ro & Ziobrowski (2010) 
note, this is in marked contrast to direct institutional investment in the property sector, which is 
predominantly diversified across property types. The arguments in favor of a focused strategy are 
that the REIT managers should have a better understanding and knowledge of specialist markets 
and sectors. This is of particular relevance in the context of such a large economy as the US as it 
reduces the number of markets for which information and market analysis is required. As 
Benefield et al. (2009) note, the costs in monitoring and analyzing additional markets in order to 
purse a diversified strategy may well offset the performance gains that could be achieved. Hence, 
although the idea of focus may initially appear to go against the principles of portfolio theory and 
diversification, the benefits may still make economic sense. In addition, the characteristics of the 
US REIT market may also possibly play a role in this regard in terms of both the nature and size 
of the firms. As of November 2008 the average market capitalization of US Equity REITs was 
US$1.3bn. Even at the end of 2006, prior to the recent downturn in the market, this figure only 
stood at US$2.9bn. However, more importantly, in 2006 36% of Equity REITs had a market 
capitalization less than US$1bn, while in 2008 this figure has increased to 60%. In the context of 
the broader US stock market, firms with a market capitalization less than US$1bn would be 
classified as small cap stocks, indeed the relationship between REITs and small and mid cap 
firms has been well documented (e.g. Clayton & MacKinnon, 2001; Chiang & Lee, 2002 and 
Ziering et al., 1999). However, the size of the firm also plays a role in the ability of the firms to 
effectively diversify. The constraints imposed on real estate fund managers to diversify in the 
conventional sense of eliminating unsystematic risk have been clearly illustrated in studies such 
as Byrne & Lee (2000). Therefore, the combination of the small size of the average US Equity 
REIT, the problems inherent in diversifying a property portfolio and the size of the US real estate 
market could also play a role in the preference of firms to remain focused.  
 
The second major argument in favor of focus comes from the perspective of investors. Financial 
theory would argue that firms should not diversify themselves but rather allow investors to make 
the diversification decision. While this stance normally relates to conglomerates the same 
argument can be advanced for firms such as REITs. However, this view is dependent on sub-
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sectors behaving differently and effectively tracking their underlying markets. While earlier 
studies such as Mueller & Laposa (1996) and Chen & Peiser (1999) do show strong relationships 
between focused REITs and the underlying property markets, Young (2000) reports that the 
correlation between property type focused REITs increased during the nineties. It is in this 
context that the current study is framed. We consider the time-varying nature of the correlation 
between specialist REIT sectors over the period 1990 through 2008 using the Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation (DCC) approach of Engle (2002). We consider whether the changing 
dynamics within the REIT sector over the last two decades has altered the relationship between 
REIT sub-sectors. The results show that there has been a marked increase in the correlations 
between all pairings of sub-sectors since 1990. The implications for both REITs themselves and 
for investors are substantial. It would appear that the sector is behaving more homogeneously 
than previously and that differences in the performance of sub-sectors is increasingly of a relative 
rather than absolute nature with the movement of share prices being driven more at a sector level. 
This would be consistent with the increased maturity of the sector over the last decades and in 
particular with the growth in mainstream institutional investment in the sector.  
 
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature to 
have considered both the broad relationship between REITs and other assets classes and those 
papers to have specifically examined property type specific REITs and the issue of diversification 
versus focus. Section 3 presents the methodological framework adopted, presents the data 
analyzed and reports the summary statistics of the series‟. Section 4 presents the main empirical 
findings, while the final section provides concluding comments.  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. The Changing Investment Dynamics of REITs 
The examination of how investment dynamics in the REIT have altered in the modern REIT era 
has largely concentrated upon the interaction of the sector with mainstream stocks. As noted in 
the introduction, Glascock et al. (2000) found that while REITs were segmented from the broader 
equity market up until 1991, there was evidence of integration since 1992. The authors also found 
that prior to 1992 the returns for both Equity and Mortgage REITs behaved in a fashion more 
similar to the fixed income market while post 1992, the Equity REIT sector acted more like 
stocks. However, a number of studies in the late nineties and early part of the last decade, 
reported findings that indicated a reduced correlation between REITs and large cap stocks in the 
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post 1992 period. Clayton and MacKinnon (2001) report that the correlation of REIT returns with 
large cap stocks declined over time, with a substantially lower coefficient reported in the nineties 
than in the seventies and eighties. Studies such as Chandrashekaran (1999) and Conover et al. 
(2002) have also reported similar findings. The argument put forward by Clayton & Mackinnon 
(2001) is based on the premise that greater institutional investment in REITs in the nineties led to 
an increase in informed investors who priced REITs more in accordance with their underlying 
fundamentals. This, it is argued, is in contrast to individual investors, who previously dominated 
REIT investment, and who had largely priced REITs in an equity market context.  
 
More recent evidence would however appear to indicate that the trend observed in the nineties has 
not continued and indeed the relationship between REITs and mainstream equities is more 
complex4. In particular it would appear that the relationship between the two has increased in the 
last decade. Cotter and Stevenson (2006) utilize a multivariate GARCH model to analyze 
dynamics in REIT volatility. Using a relatively short and quite distinct period of study (1999-
2003), they find an increasing relationship between Equity REITs and mainstream equities in 
terms of both return and volatility. Chong et al. (2009) extend this analysis to consider a longer 
time horizon of 1990 to 2005. They provide support for both observed trends, with a downward 
movement in the conditional correlation in the late nineties, but an increasing relationship 
subsequently. This is a finding also supported by Case et al. (2010). Both Chong et al. (2009) and 
Case et al. (2010) use the DCC-GARCH framework that is adopted in the current study. What is 
of further interest in the common findings of Chong et al. (2009) and Case et al. (2010) is the 
difference in the data frequency used. As Case et al. (2010) notes an important issue in any 
analysis of the dynamics of financial time series is the data frequency adopted. The use of daily, 
as with Cotter & Stevenson (2006) and Chong et al. (2009), does mean that the results are more 
exposed to short-term volatility and market sentiment issues. As the data frequency is lowered to 
monthly or quarterly returns, it would be expected that more of the fundamental characteristics of 
the dynamics come to the fore. Therefore, while the findings of Cotter & Stevenson (2006) and 
Chong et al. (2009) could perhaps imply that on a daily basis Equity REITs have become more 
subject to the influence of market sentiment, the fact that similar results are also found using 
monthly returns, as in Case et al. (2010), would indicate that the shift in the relationship is more 
substantial than the daily results would imply when considered in isolation.  
 
In a related stream of literature, a number of papers have considered the changing nature of the 
systematic risk of REITs. Crain et al. (2000) find that the unsystematic risk of REITs decreased in 
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the modern REIT era. In this case systematic risk was relative to the overall equity market. More 
recently two papers have considered the impact on REIT betas following the inclusion of REITs 
in the S&P indices in 2001. Feng et al. (2006) finds that the beta of Equity REITs rose by a 
statistically significant degree. However, the focus of this study was concerned with the inclusion 
and exclusion of REITs from the S&P REIT Index. Ambrose et al. (2007) specifically consider 
the impact of the inclusion of REITs in the S&P500 and other mainstream S&P indices. Those 
REITs that were incorporated into the S&P500 saw a significant increase in their beta with the 
S&P500 on both a weekly and daily basis. What is however of particular interest is that the beta 
of REITs included in the S&P500 relative to those outside the index did not significantly alter in 
the majority of the specifications used. Furthermore, the beta of the non-index REITs also 
significantly increased following 2001. The authors ran robustness tests to ensure that these 
findings were not due to either non-index REITs becoming more sensitive to market wide shocks 
or due to a general increase in market shocks. The results show that neither affect can explain the 
increase in the beta of the non-index REITs. These findings therefore imply that the systematic 
risk of the sector, and therefore the relationship with mainstream stocks, has increased. In 
addition, a recent paper by Chiang (2010) finds that the level of comovement within REIT sub-
sectors has increased during the modern REIT period.  
 
In contrast to the large number of empirical studies that have considered the changing nature of 
the relationship of REITs with stocks in general since the dawning of the modern REIT era, 
relatively few studies have considered the possible affect on the relationship between sub-sectors 
of the market. As noted in the introduction, the basis of the argument relating to REITs being 
focused relates to two key issues. Firstly, that by adopting a focused strategy, a REIT reduces the 
number of markets it has to follow, thereby creating efficiencies that would potentially offset any 
gains obtained from diversifying into additional sectors. Secondly, that the markets prefer REITs 
to be focused, as it allows investors to make the diversification decision themselves.  
 
2.2. Corporate Diversification 
In the broader finance context the issue of corporate diversification and the relative merits and 
problems inherent in it have been subject to a wide-ranging literature. Early studies did indeed 
argue in favor of corporate diversification often drawing on issues such as enhanced operating 
efficiency and benefits in relation to debt capacity and tax liabilities5. However, a large number of 
papers during the nineties reported the presence of a diversification discount, arguing that 
corporate diversification destroyed value. Lang & Stulz (1994) find that the Tobin‟s q of 
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diversified firms is not only lower than that for focused firms but it is also less than the average 
across all companies examined. Furthermore, these results are robust once industry effects are 
taken into account. Studies such as Berger & Ofek (1995), Comment & Jarrell (1995) and Denis 
et al. (1997, 2002) also provide evidence of a diversification discount in firm value. Comment & 
Jarrell (1995) argue that firms who do diversify fail to take advantage of diversification benefits, 
while both Berger & Ofek (1995) and Comment & Jarrell (1995) provide evidence indicating that 
the trend away from corporate diversification towards specialization was associated with 
significant increases in shareholder wealth. Non-optimal allocation of capital resources (Gertner 
et al., 2002, Dittmar & Shivdasani, 2003 and Ahn & Denis, 2004) and the non-optimal allocation 
of a diversified firms debt burden across segments (Ahn et al., 2006) have also been proposed as 
possible causes of the observed diversification discount.  
 
A number of papers have also linked the diversification issue with agency costs. Denis et al. 
(1997) argue that agency problems are a major contributory factor behind firms maintaining a 
diversified strategy. This is based upon the benefits to managers that may arise from 
diversification, such as greater prestige due to managing a larger company, increased 
compensation packages and that diversification may make the management team less dispensable. 
The paper finds that the move during the late eighties and nineties towards corporate focus is in 
part attributable to market forces and increased external monitoring. Jirapon et al. (2008) report 
that diversified firms whose directors hold multiple board positions, thereby reducing their ability 
to act as effective monitors of corporate activity, observe a deeper diversification discount.  
 
However, the evidence relating to the presence of a diversification discount is not consistent and 
there are also a number of papers to have provided contrasting findings, or alternatively queried 
the basis on which the existing empirical evidence is based. As Lang & Stulz (1994) argue, the 
appearance of a diversification discount may in part be due to poorly performing companies 
diversifying in order to seek out growth opportunities. The comparison they undertake is 
constrained by the fact that the only comparison possible is the Tobin‟s q of a diversified firm 
with the average Tobin‟s q for specialist firms in each industry. Therefore, the perceived presence 
of a diversification discount is based on the assumption that the Tobin‟s q for segments of a 
diversified firm is equal to the average figure for focused firms in those industries. Lang & Stulz 
(1994) therefore consider the performance of firms that diversify, finding that they are already 
poor performers, and the seeking of growth opportunities is a possible contributory factor behind 
the diversification discount. Hence, diversification itself is not an indicator of poor performance, 
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rather the poor performance may have preceded and in part contributed to the decision to 
diversify. Villalonga (2004a) and Hyland & Diltz (2002) provide support for this view with 
empirical results that illustrate that firms who subsequently diversified were already displaying 
signs of a discount. This is an argument that Graham et al. (2002) expand upon by considering 
corporate expansion and diversification through acquisitions. The authors show that firms that are 
incorporated into diversified firms are already, prior to the acquisition, priced at a discount. 
Therefore, once the firm is acquired it has a negative impact upon the value of the firm. In 
relation to arguments concerning the efficiency of the internal allocation of capital, Whited 
(2001) highlights possible measurement errors in Tobin‟s q. The subsequent analysis finds no 
evidence of inefficiencies in the allocation of capital across business segments in diversified 
firms. Villalonga (2004b) also highlights potential biases in the conventional means of defining 
diversification and business segments. Using this revised definition the author notes that the 
previously observed diversification discount is no longer present. Finally, Mansi & Reeb (2002) 
argue a major determinant of the discount is the level of leverage the firm has. The authors argue 
that corporate diversification leads to reduced risk. This reduced risk would therefore lead to an 
increase in bondholder value and a reduction in shareholder value with the level of leverage 
adopted by the firm a key element in the impact on shareholders. Their empirical results support 
this argument in that the diversification discount is more pronounced in those firms with higher 
leverage. In contrast, the results provided with an all equity firm sample reveal no evidence of a 
diversification discount.  
 
2.3. REIT Diversification versus Focus 
Those papers that have considered REIT sub-sectors have largely concentrated on broader 
performance issues, however, some papers have considered the issue of REIT diversification 
versus focus on a similar basis to the corporate finance literature. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Benefield et al. (2009) note that any benefits to a REIT diversifying may be offset 
by additional costs incurred in pursuing such a strategy. Capozza & Lee (1995) indeed illustrate 
this point by reporting that diversified REITs have higher average expense ratios, while Capozza 
& Seguin (1998) not only concur with this finding, but also note that the increase in expenses is 
only noticeable when a REIT diversifies by property type. The results with respect to geographic 
diversification do not concur with the sector diversification evidence. However, Capozza & 
Seguin (1998) also find that while expense costs do indeed increase as a result of diversification, 
the benefits from doing so in terms of increased revenue do provide at least a partial offset. 
Capozza & Seguin (1999) extend this analysis to consider why the markets appear to continue to 
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penalize diversified REITs if the higher cash flows and expenses are offsetting. They find that 
diversified REITs are penalized by both lenders and equity investors, providing evidence that the 
cost of debt and equity is higher. They argue that this is due to increased information asymmetries 
in that the individual segments of a diversified firm may be harder to value, a finding that has also 
been found in the broader finance literature (e.g. Nanda & Narayanan 1999). The increased 
difficulty in the valuation of the firm, due to reduced transparency, is captured by the liquidity of 
the firm, with diversified REITs having reduced liquidity. Danielsen & Harrison‟s (2007) study 
further examines this to consider the liquidity of REITs operating in different property sectors, 
finding that not only are spreads larger in diversified REITs but also for firms who operate in 
more volatile property sectors6.  
 
In relation to those papers that have considered the REIT diversification issue from an investment 
perspective two of the earliest were Gyourko & Nelling (1996) and Chen & Peiser (1999). Both 
papers reported results that indicate that diversification does not lead to improved REIT 
performance. Indeed, Chen & Peiser (1999) find that on a risk-adjusted basis diversified REITs 
underperform, while Gyourko & Nelling (1996) argue that the diversification undertaken by non-
focused REITs does not actually result in significant benefits. Two recent papers, Benefield et al. 
(2009) and Ro & Ziobrowski (2010), have further examined the issue from the perspective of the 
firms investment performance. In contrast to earlier studies, neither find strong evidence in 
support of focused REITs significantly outperforming diversified firms.  
 
Benefield et al. (2009) specifically consider the share price performance of focused REITs in 
comparison to those who adopt a diversified strategy. The study uses the conventional 
performance measures and the results do provide interesting reading. The primary empirical 
analysis involves testing for differences in the performance measures reported for the two 
samples. When using the S&P500, the CRSP value-weighted index and the CRSP small firm 
index, diversified REITs significantly outperform during the period 1995-2001, a period of poor 
sector performance, however, the difference is not statistically significant in the second period of 
2002-2006. If a multi-factor market model is adopted, the results in the 1995-2001 period are not 
significant, although diversified REITs do outperform subsequently when the SNL Equity REIT 
Index is used as the benchmark. The results are of interest in that although they may not be 
consistent across different performance model specifications and sub-periods, where significant 
results are obtained it is with respect to diversified REITs outperforming, not the other way 
around. Throughout the analysis there is no evidence of focused REITs outperforming REITs 
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who pursue a diversified strategy. One note should be made however when considering the 
Benefield et al. (2009) findings. While the overall sample consists of 75 REITs only a small 
number are classified as diversified. In the first sub-period only 14 are categorized as such and in 
the second 17. Hence, the results are based upon a small sample and the performance of the 
individual firms concerned may well have unduly influenced the findings. Indeed, Ro & 
Ziobrowski (2010) note that Vornado comprises close to half of their diversified REIT sample on 
a value-weighted basis. Furthermore, Ro & Ziobrowski (2010) argue that the failure of Benefield 
et al. (2009) to control for differences in the portfolio composition of the two samples could also 
lead to biases in their findings. Ro & Ziobrowski (2010) undertake a broadly similar study to that 
of Benefield et al. (2009), however, they attempt to control for the potential biases in the earlier 
study. They undertake the empirical work on an equally-weighted basis, as well as the more 
conventional value-weighted, to control for the undue influence of a small number of very large 
REITs. Secondly, they also control for differences in the property sectors the diversified and 
focused REITs invest in. Finally, they control for possible differences in the capital structure of 
the two samples. The results however do not differ fundamentally from Benefield et al. (2009) in 
that while they do not find evidence of diversified REITs significantly outperforming focused 
firms, nor is there evidence of the reverse7. 
 
 
3. Methodological Framework 
The data used in this analysis consists of daily data extending from January 1990 to December 
2008. Sub-sector indices produced by SNL Financial are used in the analysis. The indices are 
value-weighted, while the sector into which the REIT is categorized is based on a minimum 75% 
holding in the sector in question. The following sectors are examined in the study; Diversified, 
Healthcare, Hotel/Lodging, Industrial, Office, Retail, Residential and Self-Storage8. The use of 
value-weighted index data should be noted. As papers such as Ro & Ziobrowksi (2010) argue 
sub-sector REIT data can be unduly influenced by the presence of a small number of large cap 
firms. Whilst in the context of their study this related specifically to diversified REITs, the same 
issue will arise in the majority of the sectors. It is therefore possible that the results noted here are 
at least in part driven by large cap REITs. However, it should be noted that Ambrose et al. (2007) 
found that the relationship between large cap REITs included in the S&P 500 from 2001 and mid 
and small cap REITs that were not, did not significantly alter.  
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Table 1 reports summary statistics on the different sectors. Substantial differences in the risk 
adjusted performance are noticeable across the sectors, indicating that over the entire period there 
was a significant level of divergence in performance between different REIT sectors. The Hotel 
and Office sectors in particular severely under perform on a risk-adjusted basis, with negative 
average daily returns during the entire sample period. In contrast, the performance of sectors such 
as Healthcare, Residential and Self-Storage is far stronger. The skewness and kurtosis figures do 
indicate non-normality in a number of cases, particularly in the case of the kurtosis figures.  
 
{Insert Tables 1 and 2} 
 
Table 2 reports the unconditional correlation coefficients across both the entire sample period and 
four different sub-periods. What is immediately noticeable is that there is a marked trend in the 
coefficients. During the period 1990-1994 the average pairwise correlation was 0.1355. 
Furthermore, the range of the coefficients was relatively large, from –0.0231 (Hotel-Residential) 
to 0.3347 (Retail-Residential). The low correlations indicate that REITs during this period were 
not a homogeneous asset class with substantial variation in performance and co-movment. These 
findings imply substantial diversification benefits within the REIT sector and can perhaps be 
attributed to the relative immaturity of the sector at the time. The results are also of interest in the 
context of papers such as Mueller & Laposa (1996) and Chen & Peiser (1999) who provided 
evidence of a strong relationship between REITs and their underlying property sector. 
Furthermore, the coefficients are consistent with the findings of Ooi et al. (2009) who show that 
in the early nineties the idiosyncratic risk of REITs was extremely high. The results for this 
specific sub-period also need to be considered in the context of the changes that were occurring in 
the sector at the time. For much of this time US REITs remained a small and thinly traded sector 
with a low level of institutional investment. The low level of trading is of particular importance 
due to the use of daily data in this paper. The unconditional coefficients therefore could merely be 
capturing the nature of the market during the final years of the pre-modern REIT era. 
Furthermore, the underlying real estate sector was undergoing a major correction during the first 
part of this sub-period.  
 
However, despite the caveats that need to be clearly considered in any examination of data from 
the early nineties, what is evident across the four sub-periods is that there is marked increase in 
the correlations across the overall sample. The average unconditional coefficient increases from 
0.1355 (1990-94) to 0.5384 (1995-99) to 0.7118 (2000-04) to 0.9182 (2005-08). In the 1995-99 
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and 2000-04 periods the range (0.35 to 0.37) and standard deviation (approximately 0.09) of the 
coefficients is stable in comparison with the first period. In the late nineties the increase in the 
correlations is particularly evident, with the lowest reported coefficient for 1995-99 (0.3987) 
being higher than the largest figure reported in the first half of the decade. These findings confirm 
the results of Young (2000) who noted an increase in the correlations during the nineties. Yet, this 
trend continued into the subsequent decade. Furthermore, the period of 2005-08 saw not only the 
average correlation reach 0.9182 but also a distinct tightening of the coefficients. The standard 
deviation of the correlations fell to 0.02 and the range was reduced to 0.11 with the lowest figure 
being 0.8601 (Industrial-Self Storage) and the highest 0.9704 (Office-Retail). However, just as 
the results from the early nineties need to be examined in the context of that time, so do the 
findings from the 2005 through 2008 period. This time period obviously captures the impact of 
the credit crisis and the downturn in the underlying real estate markets. Furthermore, the first part 
of the period saw the later stages of the sustained REIT boom that had begun in 2000. 
 
While this analysis does provide preliminary evidence of a changing dynamic in the correlation 
coefficients in the sector it is limited as it purely considers the relationships across sub-periods. 
However, while a number of simple alternatives are available in order to more formally consider 
the time-varying nature of the correlations they are not without problems. Simple rolling 
unconditional correlations are an alternative, and were used in the Young (2000) study. However, 
as Case et al. (2010) note, the choice of window used in either a rolling estimation or in an 
exponentially weighted moving average framework is subjective, with no strong theoretical basis 
underpinning the choice. Furthermore, Forbes & Rigobon (2002) note that unconditional 
correlations can exhibit bias. This can be particularly noted during periods of increased volatility, 
when an upward bias can be introduced into the correlation coefficients. Therefore, the empirical 
analysis is undertaken using a multivariate GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity) framework. GARCH models have the broad advantage in that they avoid the 
need of having to assume a homoscedastic error term, which is often problematic in the context of 
financial time series due to factors such as volatility clustering, particularly when daily data is 
examined. However, the advantages of using a GARCH framework in terms of heteroscedasticity 
also extend to the modeling of correlations. In particular, the potential bias noted by Forbes & 
Rigobon (2002) in the case of unconditional correlations is eliminated. Given the increase in 
volatility in REITs over the period under examination, as highlighted in papers such as Cotter & 
Stevenson (2008) and Jirasakuldech et al. (2009), this provides further rationale behind the use of 
GARCH based conditional correlations that are not subject to the same upward bias. 
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ARCH models assume that the volatility of the series in question is a deterministic function of 
past returns and is thus conditional on previous squared error terms. The GARCH (1,1) 
specification, as proposed by Bollerslev (1986), further allows the conditional variance of the 
series to be dependent on it‟s own lags and is felt to capture the volatility dynamics of the vast 
majority of financial time series (Engle, 2004). A standard univariate GARCH (1,1) specification 
can be displayed as follows:  
 
titix ,,             (1) 
),0(~ ,, tiiti hN           (2) 
1,
2
1,,   tiiitiiitii hh          (3) 
 
where the mean is described by a first order VAR, and univariate volatility follows a GARCH 
process. The specification is subject to 1 ,0 , ,0  iiiii  . The   and   
coefficients determine the short run dynamics of the resulting volatility time series. A large   
indicates that shocks to conditional variance take a long time to dissipate; that is, volatility is said 
to be “persistent”. A large   indicates that volatility reacts intensely to recent market 
movements.  
 
The use of GARCH based models in a REIT context has increased in recent years. The papers 
that are closest in spirit to the current study are Case et al. (2010), Chong et al. (2009) and Cotter 
& Stevenson (2006). As noted in Section 2, all of these papers estimate time-varying conditional 
correlations, although in each case their focus is concerned with the relationship between REITs 
and other asset classes. In relation to other REIT papers to have used GARCH models, Stevenson 
(2002) examined volatility spillovers using monthly data within both different REIT sectors and 
between REITs and the equity and fixed-income market. Papers such as Liow et al. (2009), Liow 
& Ibrahim (2010) and Michayluk et al. (2006) have extended the analysis of volatility spillovers 
and dynamics into an international context. Jirasakuldech et al. (2009) confirm that REIT 
volatility is time-varying and that volatility has increased in the modern REIT era. Cotter & 
Stevenson (2008) consider the use of a Fractionally Integrated GARCH (FIGARCH) specification 
to examine the long memory properties of REIT volatility, finding that it does display persistence. 
Furthermore, they find that increased trading volume is an important determinant in REIT 
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volatility. Zhou & Kang (2010) also adopt a FIGARCH model, finding that it outperforms other 
GARCH specifications when forecasting volatility. In a different context Hung & Glascock 
(2010) utilize a GARCH framework to examine momentum returns, reporting that REITs display 
asymmetric volatility. In addition, a number of pieces of research have also utilized GARCH 
frameworks in the examination of the interest rate sensitivity of REITs. Devaney (2001) and 
Stevenson et al. (2007) use GARCH-M specifications to consider the time-varying interest rate 
sensitivity of US REITs and UK property companies respectively, while Bredin et al. (2007) 
model the response of REITs to unanticipated changes in the Fed Funds Rate in a GARCH 
framework.  
 
A number of alternative multivariate GARCH specifications are available that can be used to 
estimate the conditional correlations. Cotter & Stevenson (2006) in their analysis of REITs and 
other asset classes used the BEKK specification (Engle & Kroner, 1995). This model can be 
displayed as follows: 
 
*' * *' * *' ' *
, 0 0 11 , 1 11 11 , 1 , 1 11i t i t i t i tH C C A H A B B            (4) 
 
where Hi,t is the conditional variance covariance matrix at t. The BEKK does have advantages in 
comparison to other multivariate GARCH models such as VECH specification. In particular, the 
model ensures a positive definite variance covariance matrix as each matrix, C, A and B is 2 x 2 
and C is restricted to be upper triangular. However, a problem with the BEKK model is that as the 
parameters are in quadratic form it can be difficult to interpret the coefficients. For this reason we 
follow Chong et al. (2009) and Case et al. (2010) and estimate the conditional correlation 
coefficients using the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002)9. The DCC 
model initially estimates GARCH (1,1) specifications, employing the resulting standardized 
residuals to estimate the time varying correlation matrix. To do this, the residuals are transformed 
by their estimated standard deviations ttt h . The covariance matrix can be expressed as 
tttt DRDH  , where tD  is a diagonal matrix of univariate GARCH volatilities. 
1*1*  tttt QQQR  is the time varying correlation matrix, with tQ  as described by 
 
    1111   tttt bQaQbaQ       (5) 
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Q  is the unconditional covariance of standardized residuals resulting from the first stage 
estimation, and *tQ  is a diagonal matrix composed of the square root of the diagonal elements of 
tQ . As with the standard GARCH(1,1) model the coefficients of the DCC(1,1) model are 
estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure using the algorithm of BFGS. The log likelihood 
function, under the assumption of conditional multivariate normality can be displayed as follows: 
 
     





 


T
t
tttt HHTNL
1
1ln2ln
2
1
      (6) 
 
where t  is an N x 1 vector stochastic process, with  tttt EH  1 , being the N x N 
conditional variance covariance matrix. 
 
 
4. GARCH Empirical Analysis 
The estimated time varying conditional coefficients for each pairing of sectors for the GARCH-
DCC model are presented in Table 3. The figures reported include the coefficients for each 
GARCH (1,1) estimation and the DCC (1,1,) estimation. For example, for the Healthcare-
Hotel/Lodging pairing, 1, 1 and 1 represent the GARCH (1,1) coefficients for the Healthcare 
sector, while the corresponding figures, subscripted 2, are with respect to the Hotel/Lodging 
sector. The coefficients a and b refer to the DCC (1,1) estimates. The estimated GARCH-DCC 
model appears to provide a good representation of the conditional variance of the data. The sum 
of the parameter ii    estimates is close to unity, suggesting strong persistence in volatility. 
The DCC parameters, ba  , which account for the conditional covariance between the sector 
pair, are positive and significant. This is suggestive of a strong interaction between the returns of 
the sectors. Again, their sum is close to one. It is worth noting that all coefficients are significant, 
highlighting the time varying nature of conditional variances and covariances. 
 
{Insert Table 3} 
 
Figure 1 presents the time varying conditional coefficients for each pairing of sectors, while Table 
4 presents summary statistics on the results. Initially it is worth noting that in most cases the 
average conditional correlation is similar to the unconditional coefficient estimated across the 
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entire sample period, as reported in Table 2. In cases where this is not the case the average 
conditional correlation is lower. This is consistent with the problems in using the unconditional 
correlation as previously noted, in that during periods of increased volatility an upward bias can 
be introduced into the coefficients. The overall result is that the mean figure across the different 
pairings is reduced from 0.6891 with the unconditional figures to 0.5480 in the conditional case. 
In addition, the upward bias is clearly illustrated in that while the lower coefficients are not that 
different, it is in the higher reported correlations that the largest change generally occurs. For 
example, while the highest reported figure in both cases is with respect to the Retail-Residential 
pairing, the average conditional correlation is 0.7153 in comparison to the 0.8866 reported in 
Table 2.  
 
Figure 1 graphically displays the conditional correlations over time. A number of issues are of 
interest, however, the consistency across the different sectors is evident. In each case the 
conditional correlations follow a strong upwards trend during the sample period. In the first part 
of the sample, not only are the majority of the correlations relatively low, implying diversification 
potential across REIT sectors, but they also display a relatively high level of spread across the 
correlations, confirming the findings for the unconditional coefficients for the period 1990-1994. 
Indeed, in each case there are periods of time when negative conditional correlations are reported. 
However, from the mid-nineties onwards there is a distinct upward trend in the conditional 
correlations, to the extent that by the end of the sample there are few conditional correlations 
reported below 0.8, and in addition, the correlations tend to be far more tightly banded than in the 
past. While this upward movement was in part illustrated by the figures in Table 2, these results, 
free of an upward bias, clearly indicate that the sector has undergone a distinct shift over the last 
two decades. To further illustrate the upward movement in the correlations we regress the 
conditional correlations on a time trend, with the coefficients reported in Table 4. In each case the 
regression coefficient is positive and at high levels of statistical significance. These findings 
imply that the sector has over time become more integrated10.  
 
{Insert Figure 1 and Table 4} 
 
The implications of these findings for the REIT sector are apparent in a number of respects. The 
most immediate implication is that diversification potential within the REIT sector has reduced in 
the last two decades with the sub-sectors behaving in a more homogeneous manner than in the 
past. This has a number of consequences. If REITs are behaving in a more homogenous manner, 
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then this calls into question the investment based argument for REITs to be focused. As noted in 
the introduction, it is commonly argued that REITs should adopt a focused investment strategy in 
order that investors can make their own diversification decisions. However, this is based on an 
underlying assumption that performance does differ and that the share prices of REITs reflect the 
fundamentals of the underlying property sectors. This paper hasn‟t considered the comparative 
performance of the underlying real estate sectors therefore an explicit comparison in this regard 
cannot be made. However, while it cannot be definitively stated that the linkages between REITs 
and their respective underlying sectors has weakened during this period, it is clear that the capital 
markets are not differentiating between sub-sectors as clearly as in the past.  
 
As highlighted in the introduction, a key element in any analysis of REITs over the last two 
decades is the growing maturity of the sector as observed by an increase in the number of listed 
REITs during the nineties, institutional investment and trading volume. The impact of this has 
been considered with respect to specific issues such as the relationship of REITs and the overall 
stock market (e.g. Glascock et al., 2000 and Case et al., 2010), the number of REIT analysts (e.g. 
Wang et al., 1995), bid-ask spreads (e.g. Below et al., 1996 and Bhasin et al., 1997), the behavior 
of REIT mutual funds (e.g. Ling & Naranjo, 2006 and Hartzell et al., 2010), flow of funds effects 
(e.g. Chan et al., 1998 and Ling & Naranjo, 2003) and volatility in REIT share prices (e.g. Cotter 
& Stevenson, 2008 and Jirasakuldech et al., 2009). However, few pieces of work have attempted 
to tie these impacts together. The growth and increased maturity of the sector may have had a 
number of interlinked consequences on the dynamics of REITs. In particular, while the increase 
in institutional investment has been directly linked to issues such as spreads and flow of funds, an 
element that has often been ignored is the actual nature of the investors. If the increase in 
institutional investment has been concentrated in mainstream equity investors then it is probable 
that the nature of the comparison investors make has shifted away from the private real estate 
market towards the broader stock market11. The key question is whether REITs have been 
increasingly analyzed on the basis of their relative attractiveness compared to other equity 
sectors. If this is the case, which would be consistent with an increase in equity based institutional 
investment, then it could be an important factor in the more homogeneous behavior of the sector. 
This view would also be consistent with those findings that considered the impact of noise 
traders. Lin et al. (2009) highlight the importance of investor sentiment in the context of REIT 
performance, while Barkham & Ward (1999) in their analysis of UK property companies find that 
only 15% of the variation in the discount to Net Asset Value (NAV) is firm specific, with the 
majority of the movement being driven at a sector level. Such effects could possibly explain the 
 20 
findings we report in this paper and the movement away from absolute differences in the 
performance of REIT sectors, as observed through the low correlations in the early part of the 
sample, towards relative differences in the performance. The fact that our findings reveal a steady 
upward movement in the conditional correlations would also imply such a shift in pricing.  
 
It is of interest that there are no discernable common patterns in the results reported here and 
those in Chong et al. (2009) and Case et al. (2010). Whereas both of these papers noted an 
upward trend in the conditional correlation of REITs and the broader equity market there were 
also noticeable trends in that the correlation fell in the late nineties but rose subsequently. The 
fact that our findings reveal no such pattern is of importance as it implies that the upward trend is 
not connected with the general relationship between REITs and the broader equity markets. 
Furthermore, this also aids in the reconciliation of results reported in papers that have considered 
the relationship between REITs and the general stock market and that while during the mid to late 
nineties there was a downward shift in the correlation, this altered during the last decade. This 
may be indicative of a period of time in the late nineties when REITs were providing less 
attractive investment opportunities than other equity sectors, and in particular technology stocks. 
It is therefore of interest to note that during the 1998-2000 phase, when the REIT sector 
underperformed the overall equity market, REIT mutual fund flows of funds were negative (Ling 
& Naranjo, 2006). In contrast, during the subsequent period, and particularly from 2001 to 2003, 
fund flows were positive at a time when the REIT sector outperformed the market. Therefore, the 
relative performance of REITs with respect to the overall market can be possibly seen to account 
for the reduced correlation. Effectively, while the headline relationship between REITs and stocks 
became weaker, the sector was potentially being influenced by the general market more than ever. 
Furthermore, during that 1998 to 2003 period it can be argued that REITs were effectively acting 
as a counter cyclical defensive equity sector.  
 
The findings can also be linked to those of Benefield et al. (2009) and Ro & Ziobrowski (2010) 
with respect to the fact that diversified REITs did not significantly underperform their focused 
counterparts. The noted increased homogeneity of the sector as found with our results, perhaps 
helps to explain the insignificant findings reported particularly by Ro & Ziobrowski (2010). Not 
withstanding other issues, the fact that the sub-sectors are behaving in such a similar manner 
would make the identification of significant differences in the results difficult.  
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In addition to the broad findings and the implications contained therein, there are other points of 
interest in the results. In particular, while the results do clearly illustrate a strong upward trend in 
the correlations, there are also patterns in the time varying nature of the coefficients. In particular, 
it is noticeable that in the early part of the sample the correlations were actually quite high and 
then dropped considerably in 1990-1992. As with the overall finding this result is consistent 
across all sub-sector pairings. This raises a number of issues. Firstly, that the extremely low 
coefficients reported in the early nineties may just be a feature of that time. The lack of quality 
sub-sector data extending back beyond 1990 does limit our ability to analyze this fully: however 
it is an issue that needs to be considered. Furthermore, the results are consistent with those of Ooi 
et al. (2009) with respect to the levels of idiosyncratic risk present in REITs. Ooi et al. (2009) 
found that idiosyncratic risk was relatively high in the early nineties before reducing during the 
decade. However, even if one takes into account the behavior of the sector in the early part of the 
nineties, the upward movement in the coefficients continued to occur throughout the nineties and 
into the past decade.  
 
To further consider the issues we study the relation between conditional correlations and 
conditional volatilities by regressing the former on the latter as follows: 
 
ttreitsreitst h   ,          (7) 
 
The conditional volatility figure used is based on that for the overall Equity REIT sector and is 
obtained through the estimation of a standard GARCH (1,1) model. A positive beta coefficient 
would suggest that the conditional correlations rise with the overall volatility of the REIT sector. 
The results are contained in Table 5 and are in each case positive and significant. This implies 
that the conditional correlations rise during periods of increased volatility. This point does 
however need to be carefully considered. An initial reading of the results would imply that the 
sector behaves more homogeneously during periods of increased volatility or high market stress. 
Whilst this would be consistent with the broader volatility literature with respect to equity 
markets, the results do have to be viewed in the context that not only have the conditional 
correlations increased over the sample period, but as illustrated in papers such as Cotter & 
Stevenson (2008) and Jirasakuldech et al. (2009), so has the volatility of the REIT sector.  
 
{Insert Table 5} 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has considered whether, in line with other aspects of the dynamics of the sector, the 
modern REIT era has altered the relationship between REIT sub-sectors in terms of their relative 
investment performance. The results highlight that there has been a distinct and continued upward 
trend in the conditional correlations between the sub-sectors since the early nineties. The findings 
do imply that that the sector has become more homogeneous over the last two decades. The 
results also reduce the strength of the investment based argument to support the view that REITs 
should be focused in terms of their investment strategy. If, as found here, the markets are not 
differentiating between different REIT sectors to the extent that they did in the past, then the 
argument that REITs should remain focused in order that investors can make their own real estate 
diversification decision is reduced. It is important to note that real estate specific issues can still 
arise. However, given the high level of the correlations reported, this is likely to be in relative not 
absolute terms, with the majority of the movement of REIT share prices being driven increasingly 
at a sector level. Furthermore, it needs to be emphasized that the argument in favor of focus based 
on the view that the monetary gains from diversification are largely offset by increased expenses 
remains. Furthermore, the liquidity issues with regard to diversified REITs as noted by Capozza 
& Seguin (1999) and Danielsen & Harrison‟s (2007) also do remain a justifiable issue in a REITs 
decision to diversify or to focus. The results should therefore be purely viewed from the 
perspective of the share price performance of the different sectors.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Daily Returns Series 
 Average 
Daily 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum 
Healthcare REITs 0.0265% 1.2703% 0.3132 34.0581 -16.64% 15.22% 
Hotel/Lodging REITs -0.0019% 2.6439% 0.2126 22.7716 -33.94% 24.69% 
Industrial REITs 0.0040% 1.7248% -0.4108 48.1598 -26.27% 24.55% 
Diversified REITs 0.0052% 1.3258% 0.5710 36.8222 -17.13% 18.14% 
Office REITs -0.0034% 1.5262% -0.0764 40.7282 -22.02% 20.70% 
Retail REITs 0.0164% 1.3474% 0.7141 58.4468 -19.56% 21.62% 
Residential REITs 0.0214% 1.2992% 0.4365 49.8272 -19.46% 18.34% 
Self Storage REITs 0.0428% 1.4995% 0.4362 33.9548 -18.37% 19.18% 
Note: Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for each of the sub-sectors of the REIT market for the entire 
sample period, 1990-2008 The first two moments are expressed in percentage form. The skewness and 
kurtosis statistics have a value of 0 for a normal distribution.  
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Table 2: Unconditional Correlations by Sub-Period 
 1990-
2008 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
2005-
2008 
Healthcare-Hotel/Lodging 0.4777 0.0721 0.4088 0.5423 0.8998 
Healthcare-Industrial 0.7143 0.1359 0.4566 0.6954 0.8801 
Healthcare-Diversified 0.7841 0.2508 0.4691 0.6522 0.9379 
Healthcare-Office 0.7155 0.1366 0.4363 0.7037 0.9298 
Healthcare-Retail 0.8360 0.3064 0.5690 0.7592 0.9293 
Healthcare-Residential 0.8109 0.1740 0.5428 0.6904 0.9284 
Healthcare-Self Storage 0.7117 0.0829 0.4039 0.6343 0.9053 
Hotel/Lodging-Industrial 0.4643 0.0833 0.4308 0.6266 0.8825 
Hotel/Lodging-Diversified 0.5125 0.1597 0.4792 0.5811 0.9226 
Hotel/Lodging-Office 0.4863 0.1143 0.4900 0.6593 0.9286 
Hotel/Lodging-Retail 0.5213 0.1035 0.5325 0.6850 0.9189 
Hotel/Lodging-Residential 0.4845 -0.0231 0.4965 0.6417 0.9110 
Hotel/Lodging-Self Storage 0.4193 -0.0086 0.3987 0.5039 0.8827 
Industrial-Diversified 0.7265 0.1972 0.5205 0.7118 0.8945 
Industrial-Office 0.6956 0.1259 0.5714 0.8542 0.9108 
Industrial-Retail 0.7881 0.1963 0.6486 0.8528 0.9087 
Industrial-Residential 0.7576 0.1052 0.6696 0.8505 0.8854 
Industrial-Self Storage 0.6561 0.0508 0.5270 0.7070 0.8601 
Diversified-Office 0.7615 0.2704 0.5905 0.7336 0.9584 
Diversified-Retail 0.8406 0.2907 0.6074 0.7606 0.9566 
Diversified-Residential 0.8122 0.1068 0.6068 0.7285 0.9498 
Diversified-Self Storage 0.7097 0.0520 0.4763 0.6192 0.9265 
Office-Retail 0.7942 0.1541 0.6709 0.8697 0.9704 
Office-Residential 0.7579 0.0249 0.6927 0.8783 0.9439 
Office-Self Storage 0.6461 -0.0076 0.5014 0.6991 0.9135 
Retail-Residential 0.8866 0.3347 0.7631 0.8478 0.9449 
Retail-Self Storage 0.7663 0.1566 0.5580 0.7289 0.9168 
Residential-Self Storage 0.7579 0.1496 0.5578 0.7124 0.9137 
Average 0.6891 0.1355 0.5384 0.7118 0.9182 
Standard Deviation 0.1341 0.0944 0.0938 0.0981 0.0265 
Range 0.4674 0.3578 0.3644 0.3744 0.1103 
Note: Table 2 reports the unconditional correlation coefficients reported across the entire sample period, 
1990-2008 and three sub-periods. The final row in the table reports the average correlation coefficient 
reported across each pairing for each period. 
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Table 3: DCC GARCH Estimates 
 1 
(*1,000) 
2 
(*1,000) 
1 2 β1 β2 a b 
Healthcare-Hotel/Lodging 0.0005** 0.0017** 0.0904*** 0.1314*** 0.9128*** 0.8792*** 0.0165*** 0.9833*** 
Healthcare-Industrial 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0690*** 0.0681*** 0.9322*** 0.9325*** 0.0215*** 0.9779*** 
Healthcare-Diversified 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0854*** 0.0779*** 0.9144*** 0.9210*** 0.0283*** 0.9708*** 
Healthcare-Office 0.0005*** 0.0008*** 0.0776*** 0.0760*** 0.9242*** 0.9251*** 0.0217*** 0.9776*** 
Healthcare-Retail 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0836*** 0.0938*** 0.9161*** 0.9029*** 0.0289*** 0.9705*** 
Healthcare-Residential 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0921*** 0.0941*** 0.9083*** 0.9059*** 0.0379*** 0.9611*** 
Healthcare-Self Storage 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0772*** 0.0676*** 0.9243*** 0.9341*** 0.0260*** 0.9739*** 
Hotel/Lodging-Industrial 0.0019*** 0.0007*** 0.1310*** 0.0800*** 0.8800*** 0.9226*** 0.0167*** 0.9832*** 
Hotel/Lodging-Diversified 0.0018*** 0.0006*** 0.1299*** 0.0856*** 0.8816*** 0.9178*** 0.0312*** 0.9684*** 
Hotel/Lodging-Office 0.0020*** 0.0009*** 0.1376*** 0.0886*** 0.8755*** 0.9153*** 0.0158*** 0.9841*** 
Hotel/Lodging-Retail 0.0016*** 0.0009*** 0.1286*** 0.1106*** 0.8810*** 0.8880*** 0.0267*** 0.9729*** 
Hotel/Lodging-Residential 0.0019*** 0.0007*** 0.1416*** 0.1162*** 0.8706*** 0.8866*** 0.0302*** 0.9692*** 
Hotel/Lodging-Self Storage 0.0017*** 0.0006*** 0.1237*** 0.0740*** 0.8862*** 0.9295*** 0.0247*** 0.9748*** 
Industrial-Diversified 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 0.0763*** 0.0776*** 0.9226*** 0.9213*** 0.0358*** 0.9628*** 
Industrial-Office 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0699*** 0.0684*** 0.9312*** 0.9309*** 0.0291*** 0.9702*** 
Industrial-Retail 0.0007** 0.0008** 0.0666*** 0.0795*** 0.9325*** 0.9161*** 0.0272*** 0.9719*** 
Industrial-Residential 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0707*** 0.0780*** 0.9293*** 0.9217*** 0.0396*** 0.9588*** 
Industrial-Self Storage 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0660*** 0.0691*** 0.9332*** 0.9332*** 0.0235*** 0.9752*** 
Diversified-Office 0.0008*** 0.0012*** 0.0800*** 0.0832*** 0.9187*** 0.9155*** 0.0430*** 0.9547*** 
Diversified-Retail 0.0010*** 0.0013*** 0.0886*** 0.1145*** 0.9076*** 0.8797*** 0.0400*** 0.9587*** 
Diversified-Residential 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0864*** 0.1057*** 0.9130*** 0.8926*** 0.0529*** 0.9458*** 
Diversified-Self Storage 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0785*** 0.0706*** 0.9216*** 0.9313*** 0.0386*** 0.9599*** 
Office-Retail 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0731*** 0.0828*** 0.9265*** 0.9137*** 0.0325*** 0.9661*** 
Office-Residential 0.0008*** 0.0006*** 0.0812*** 0.0912*** 0.9206*** 0.9111*** 0.0505*** 0.9475*** 
Office-Self Storage 0.0011*** 0.0008*** 0.0815*** 0.0739*** 0.9176*** 0.9272*** 0.0267*** 0.9718*** 
Retail-Residential 0.0014* 0.0011*** 0.1264*** 0.1183*** 0.8700*** 0.8799*** 0.0607*** 0.9373*** 
Retail-Self Storage 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.1206*** 0.0906*** 0.8759*** 0.9116*** 0.0443*** 0.9542*** 
Residential-Self Storage 0.0007*** 0.0009*** 0.0909*** 0.0749*** 0.9090*** 0.9270*** 0.0478*** 0.9502*** 
Note: Table 3 reports the coefficients from the GARCH-DCC estimations. The ,  and  coefficients refer to the respective GARCH (1,1) model, with a 
subscript of 1 refer to the first sector and a subscript of 2 referring to the second sector noted in the first column of the table. The a and b coefficients refer to the 
DCC (1,1) estimates. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1: Time Series Plots for Daily Conditional Correlations 
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Note: Figure 1 graphically displays the conditional correlation coefficients, as estimated using the 
GARCH-DCC (1,1) procedure, for each pairing of REIT sub-sectors. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Conditional Correlations 
 Average Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Trend  
(x 1,000) 
T-Ratio R-Squared 
Healthcare-Hotel/Lodging 0.4379 -0.1108 0.9415 0.2791 0.1852 156.6215*** 0.8371 
Healthcare-Industrial 0.5093 -0.2052 0.9303 0.2718 0.1747 132.4035*** 0.7859 
Healthcare-Diversified 0.5575 -0.0107 0.9656 0.2445 0.1510 112.3028*** 0.7254 
Healthcare-Office 0.5167 -0.1444 0.9590 0.2821 0.1788 124.1094*** 0.7633 
Healthcare-Retail 0.6170 -0.0851 0.9552 0.2258 0.1380 108.9503*** 0.7131 
Healthcare-Residential 0.5741 -0.6843 0.9782 0.2575 0.1533 99.2140*** 0.6733 
Healthcare-Self Storage 0.4626 -0.4564 0.9586 0.2817 0.1820 135.5601*** 0.7937 
Hotel/Lodging-Industrial 0.4634 -0.1434 0.9125 0.2827 0.1866 151.6822*** 0.8281 
Hotel/Lodging-Diversified 0.4739 -0.2112 0.9587 0.2990 0.1833 109.3887*** 0.7148 
Hotel/Lodging-Office 0.4888 -0.2290 0.9540 0.3028 0.1957 135.4392*** 0.7934 
Hotel/Lodging-Retail 0.5166 -0.1446 0.9510 0.2837 0.1865 148.0132*** 0.8210 
Hotel/Lodging-Residential 0.4669 -0.7267 0.9648 0.3173 0.2034 130.4727*** 0.7809 
Hotel/Lodging-Self Storage 0.3892 -0.4386 0.9478 0.2916 0.1894 138.9903*** 0.8018 
Industrial-Diversified 0.5579 -0.1924 0.9499 0.2765 0.1711 112.9975*** 0.7278 
Industrial-Office 0.5749 -0.1934 0.9636 0.3196 0.2053 131.8933*** 0.7846 
Industrial-Retail 0.6395 -0.0092 0.9658 0.2618 0.1709 142.6710*** 0.8100 
Industrial-Residential 0.6219 -0.7614 0.9660 0.2890 0.1805 117.0350*** 0.7415 
Industrial-Self Storage 0.5187 -0.3972 0.9254 0.2650 0.1758 156.3712*** 0.8366 
Diversified-Office 0.5878 -0.2297 0.9833 0.2755 0.1697 111.1886*** 0.7214 
Diversified-Retail 0.6487 -0.0481 0.9804 0.2365 0.1404 98.5050*** 0.6702 
Diversified-Residential 0.5973 -0.8861 0.9910 0.2822 0.1627 90.5300*** 0.6318 
Diversified-Self Storage 0.5016 -0.6722 0.9726 0.2848 0.1775 116.0429*** 0.7382 
Office-Retail 0.6475 -0.1463 0.9884 0.2797 0.1762 121.1525*** 0.7545 
Office-Residential 0.6263 -0.8645 0.9807 0.3178 0.1937 107.1841*** 0.7064 
Office-Self Storage 0.4972 -0.5564 0.9548 0.3010 0.1982 149.6273*** 0.8242 
Retail-Residential 0.7153 -0.1094 0.9780 0.2387 0.1347 85.5653*** 0.6052 
Retail-Self Storage 0.5677 -0.1363 0.9601 0.2646 0.1677 124.3471*** 0.7640 
Residential-Self Storage 0.5672 -0.2625 0.9733 0.2500 0.1562 117.1072*** 0.7417 
 
Note: “Trend” is the slope coefficient of a regression of conditional correlations on a constant and a time trend. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 
5% level and *** at the 1% level. The sample covers the period January 1990 to December 2008. 
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Table 5: Modeling Conditional Correlations and Volatility 
 Intercept REIT Volatility R-Squared 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Healthcare-Hotel/Lodging -0.0980 -10.6418*** 6.1170 61.5733*** 0.4425 
Healthcare-Industrial 0.0024 0.2669 5.7845 58.5051*** 0.4175 
Healthcare-Diversified 0.0934 11.4740*** 5.2962 60.3311*** 0.4325 
Healthcare-Office -0.0117 -1.2364 6.0302 58.9326*** 0.4210 
Healthcare-Retail 0.2075 26.7297*** 4.6732 55.8149*** 0.3948 
Healthcare-Residential 0.1554 16.5208*** 4.7792 47.1242*** 0.3173 
Healthcare-Self Storage -0.0634 -6.6806*** 6.0030 58.6303*** 0.4185 
Hotel/Lodging-Industrial -0.0543 -5.6193*** 5.9080 56.7265*** 0.4025 
Hotel/Lodging-Diversified -0.0826 -8.1819*** 6.3511 58.3135*** 0.4159 
Hotel/Lodging-Office -0.0509 -4.8373*** 6.1602 54.2553*** 0.3813 
Hotel/Lodging-Retail 0.0083 0.8459 5.8009 54.7058*** 0.3852 
Hotel/Lodging-Residential -0.0561 -4.8727*** 5.9692 48.0809*** 0.3261 
Hotel/Lodging-Self Storage -0.1621 -16.6477*** 6.2928 59.9137*** 0.4291 
Industrial-Diversified 0.0677 7.0176*** 5.5950 53.7950*** 0.3773 
Industrial-Office 0.0503 4.3318*** 5.9871 47.7778*** 0.3233 
Industrial-Retail 0.2220 23.0158*** 4.7647 45.8015*** 0.3051 
Industrial-Residential 0.2223 19.8214*** 4.5609 37.7118*** 0.2294 
Industrial-Self Storage 0.0769 8.0406*** 5.0424 48.8835*** 0.3334 
Diversified-Office 0.0874 9.2334*** 5.7105 55.9391*** 0.3958 
Diversified-Retail 0.2421 28.8252*** 4.6405 51.2400*** 0.3547 
Diversified-Residential 0.1613 15.3079*** 4.9754 43.7874*** 0.2864 
Diversified-Self Storage 0.0078 0.7715 5.6362 51.9256*** 0.3608 
Office-Retail 0.2026 19.6354*** 5.0778 45.6419*** 0.3036 
Office-Residential 0.1824 14.8360*** 5.0669 38.2267*** 0.2342 
Office-Self Storage -0.0074 -0.6832 5.7592 49.3187*** 0.3374 
Retail-Residential 0.3862 41.6504*** 3.7559 37.5673*** 0.2280 
Retail-Self Storage 0.1205 12.7128*** 5.1041 49.9322*** 0.3429 
Residential-Self Storage 0.1287 14.6642*** 5.0037 52.8616*** 0.3691 
 
Note: The results are obtained from estimating the regression ttRRt h   , . The conditional 
volatilities and covariances are calculated as the fitted values. The conditional correlations are measured as 
the ratio of the conditional covariances to the product of the conditional volatilities. 2R  is the adjusted 
coefficient of determination statistic. * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** 
at the 1% level. The sample covers the period January 1990 to December 2008. The sample covers the 
period January 1990 to December 2008. 
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Endnotes: 
                                                          
1 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act increased the attractiveness of institutional investment 
in REITs while the UPREIT structure allowed real estate investors to effectively defer capital 
gains tax liabilities when establishing a REIT. 
2 This paper focuses upon what are referred to as Equity REITs and are those firms that invest in 
the private real estate market. In addition, there are Mortgage REITs which invest in the real 
estate related debt, including Mortgage Backed Securities. Furthermore, there are some remaining 
Hybrid REITs that undertake investment in both the equity and debt markets. 
3 The paper by Lin & Yung (2006) utilizes similar data and hence is subject to the same issues. 
They find no evidence of equity capital flows affecting subsequent REIT returns, although they 
do find evidence of REIT returns having a significant impact upon future capital flows.  
4 For a comprehensive review of studies of the relationship between Equity REITs and stocks see 
Case et al. (2010).  
5 See for example, Bradley et al. (1988), Fluck & Lynch (1999) and Kaplan & Weisbach (1992).  
6 Cronqvist et al. (2001) also finds evidence in line with the broader finance literature by linking 
agency issues with the diversification discount noted. Furthermore, Campbell et al. (2003) argues 
that the excess returns reported with respect to REIT portfolio acquisitions can be attributed to the 
signaling effect that the deals send to the market in terms of their continued focused portfolio 
strategy. The findings of Danielsen & Harrison (2007) also reduces the importance of a common 
word of caution noted with respect to the Capozza & Seguin (1998, 1999) studies. For both 
papers the sample period examined ended in 1992, i.e. prior to the beginning of the modern REIT 
era. It is therefore often been felt that the effect of information asymmetry on liquidity may differ 
in the post 1992 period. The fact that Danielsen & Harrison (2007) find supporting evidence with 
respect to REIT spreads does imply that the arguments still stand. 
7 Ro & Ziobrowski (2010) do however find evidence of significant differences in the systematic 
risk of the samples. In contrast though, using an international sample, Boer et al. (2005) report 
that the corporate focus/specialization of listed real estate firms does not affect the systematic risk 
of the firms. 
8 More detailed indices are available for the retail and residential sectors. For example, retail is 
divided into specific property types such as shopping centers. The empirical analysis was also 
conducted with these indices and these results are available from the authors. The results with 
respect to the more detailed indices do not fundamentally differ when compared to other sectors. 
When the tests were run within either retail or residential, as one would expect, the results show 
far higher conditional correlations. However, given that the focus of the study is concerned with 
the broader sector splits only the overall results for retail and residential are provided.  
9 Early versions of this paper did model the conditional correlations using the BEKK approach. 
The analysis in this version of the paper ran from 1990 to June 2006. The results are available 
from the authors and do not differ substantially from those contained in this version. 
10 As Case et al. (2010) note an important issue in any analysis of REITs is the data frequency 
adopted. The use of daily data in the current study does mean that the analysis is undertaken with 
share prices more prone to market shocks and sentiment issues. It is possible that if the analysis 
were to be undertaken with lower frequency data then the patterns observed would not be as 
distinct. 
11 While the proportion of the REIT sector held by dedicated REIT mutual funds has indeed 
increased, it does not account for the full increase in institutional ownership, as the figures 
reported in Lin et al. (2009) and Hartzell et al. (2010) illustrate. 
